jury may say he is entitled to recover. Hence the electing to obtain redress by either one of those modes amounts to a waiver of the other, so that both cannot be prosecuted at the same time. (v)

In most cases however, the party may resort to all his securities and have all his remedies put in operation at the same time. As in the case of a pawn, the right to detain which is not divested by the pawnee's also taking a covenant or further security on which he may sue the person of the covenantor. The covenant is considered as affording an additional remedy and the party may proceed on both. (w) So too the holder of a promissory note or bill of exchange may sue the maker or drawer and each endorser separately at one and the same time; although he can recover but one entire satisfaction. (x) And so too under the process of this court, which is more effectual than that of the common law tribunals; there may be a sequestration against the goods, although the party himself is in custody upon an attachment: whereas at law, if a capias ad satisfaciendum is executed there can no fieri facias issue. (y)

Where the debt has been secured by a mortgage, a covenant to repay, and a bond, the creditor may be allowed to pursue all his remedies at once. He may bring an action of covenant to repay the money; institute an ejectment against the tenant in possession; file a bill in equity to foreclose; and also maintain a suit upon the bond at the same time. But he cannot have the mortgaged property awarded to him by a decree of foreclosure, and also recover the money or any part of it from the debtor by a suit upon the covenant or bond. (z)

The mortgaged estate is considered as a pledge sufficient for the satisfaction of the debt; and as having been so taken by the parties themselves by the nature of their contract. Therefore if the creditor, on his bill in equity, has a decree to foreclose and nothing more, he is held to have obtained that kind of satisfaction of his claim for which he stipulated; and if after such a decree he sues upon the bond, he thereby opens the decree, and admits the right of the mortgagor to redeem; because by the institution of the suit he disclaims the satisfaction he had obtained by the

⁽v) Holmes v. Wainewright, 1 Swan. 23; Cotterel v. Hooke, 1 Doug. 97.—(w) Smart v. Wolff, 3 T. R. 342.—(x) Smith v. Woodcock, 4 T. R. 691.—(y) Morrice v. The Bank, Cas. Tem. Tal. 222; Martin v. Kerridge, 3 P. Will. 240.—(z) Powel Mortg. 204, 966; Toplis v. Baker, 2 Cox, 123.